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I. INTRODUCTION 
The deal that Google would get under the proposed amended settlement in the Authors Guild case is 
exclusive in one very important sense. Many out-of-print books are so-FDOOHG ´RUSKDQZRUNVµ WKH\·UH LQ
FRS\ULJKWEXWWKHLUFRS\ULJKWRZQHUVFDQ·WEHIRXQG,I\RXRU,VWDUWSULQWLQJQHZFRSLHVRIWKHVHERRNV
ZH·GEHFRS\ULJKW LQIULQJHUV VXEMHFt to statutory damages of up to $150,000 a book³or even jail time. 
*RRJOH RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG ZLOO EH DXWKRUL]HG WR VHOO RQOLQH FRSLHV RI WKHVH ERRNV 7KDW·V H[FOXVLYLW\
permission to do what is forbidden to others. 
Some pro-settlement commentators have challenged this view. They believe that the market for 
electronic editions of orphan books is RSHQWR*RRJOH·VFRPSHWLWRUV2  They make three principal claims: 
first, that the settlement creates no new entry barriers; second, that it explicitly enables the new Book 
Rights Registry to issue licenses to competitors; and third, that competitors could reasonably expect to 
obtain class-DFWLRQVHWWOHPHQWVVXEVWDQWLDOO\LGHQWLFDOWR*RRJOH·V$OOWKUHHRIWKHVHSURSRVLWLRQVDUHZURQJ
In this essay, I will explain why. 
II. COMPARATIVE ENTRY BARRIERS ARE HIGHER AFTER THE SETTLEMENT THAN BEFORE 
6HWWOHPHQW SURSRQHQWV W\SLFDOO\ VWDUW ZLWK WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH VHWWOHPHQW LV ´QRQH[FOXVLYHµ
EHFDXVHLWGRHVQ·WSURKLELWFRS\ULJKWRZQHUVIURPGHDOLQJZLWK*RRJOH·VFRPSHWLWRUs. That might be a fair 
characterization if this were merely a private contract for widgetium (the crucial mineral input to 
widgets)³but copyrights are different. 
The Copyright Act deals in exclusive rights.  No one besides the copyright owner is allowed to 
KDQGRXWOLFHQVHV,IWKLVZHUHZLGJHWLXP*RRJOH·VFRPSHWLWRUVFRXOGGHDOZLWKDOWHUQDWLYHVXSSOLHUVEXW
HDFKFRS\ULJKWLVLWVRZQPLQLDWXUHPRQRSRO\,W·VDWRUWDQGDFULPHWRVHOOFRSLHVRIDERRNZLWKRXWWKH
FRS\ULJKWRZQHU·VSHUPLVVLRQ7KDWPDWWHrs because many of those copyright owners have gone AWOL. 
7KHVHDUHWKHRUSKDQRZQHUVZKRFDQ·WEHIRXQG7KHUHDUHDORWRIWKHPWRRHVWLPDWHVDUHWKDWWKHUHDUH
hundreds of thousands of orphan books.3 Since only the owner can grant permission and thesHRZQHUVFDQ·W
be found, there is no feasible, legal way for a Google competitor to sell copies of these books.4 
*RRJOHKRZHYHUGLGQ·WDFWXDOO\WUDFNGRZQWKHVHRUSKDQRZQHUV$VDFODVVDFWLRQWKHVHWWOHPHQW
rests on the fiction that the class members FRQVHQW WR *RRJOH·V IXWXUH DFWLRQV )RU RUSKDQ RZQHUV WKH
                                               
1 James Grimmelmann is Associate Professor at New York Law School and a member of its Institute for Information Law 
and Policy. 
2 See Mark Lemley, An Antitrust Assessment of the Google Book Search Settlement; David Balto, The Earth is Not Flat: The Public 
Interest and the Google Book Search Settlement: A Reply to Grimmelmann, ACSBLOG, Jul. 22, 2009, 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/13812; Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan 
Books, 5 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 411 (2009); Einer Elhauge, Framing the Antitrust Issues in the Google Books Settlement, GLOBAL 
COMPETITION POLICY (Oct. 2009); Einer Elhauge, Why The Google Books Settlement Is Procompetitive, JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(forthcoming). 
3 See, e.g., Michael Cairns, 580,388 Orphan Works ² Give or Take, PERSONA NON DATA, 
http://personanondata.blogspot.com/2009/09/580388-orphan-works-give-or-take.html (Sept. 9, 2009). 
4 There are some infeasible ways: signed permission from every man, woman, and child alive should suffice. 
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ILFWLRQLVDWUDQVSDUHQWOLH*RRJOH·VPDUNHWSODFHDGYDQWDJHIRURUSKDQERRNVZRXOGFRPHIURPWKHVWURNH
RI D'LVWULFW -XGJH·V SHQ QRW IURP ´VXSHULRU SURGXFW EXVLQHVV DFXPHQRU KLVWRULF DFFLGHQWµ5 *RRJOH·V
legal advantage over its competitors is thus not external to the settlement, but inherent in it. Selectively 
lowering legal barriers for Google should receive as much scrutiny as selectively raising them for its 
competitors. 
III. THE SETTLEMENT DOES NOT LICENSE COMPETITORS 
Next, settlement advocates have argued that the settlement itself can provide a hypothetical Google 
competitor³OHW·V FDOO LW ´7ZR-JOHµ³the copyright licenses it would need. At every turn, however, the 
settlement deliberately avoids such an arrangement. 
The settlement is explicit that the only parties who directly receive licenses of any sort are Google 
(to scan books6 and sell access7) and its partner libraries.8 No one else is licensed by the settlement to do 
anything³QRW WKHXVHUVRI*RRJOH·VQHZ VHUYLFHVQRWHYHQ WKH5HJLVWU\ 6LPLODUO\RQO\*RRJOH DQG LWV
partner libraries are released from liability for their actions pursuant to the settlement.9 Likewise, the 
settlement explicitly refuses to transfer any copyrights from orphan owners to entities potentially more 
willing to issue licenses.10 
One tantalizingly obscure passage in the settlement has misled some of its academic proponents: 
The Registry will be organized on a basis that allows the Registry, among other things, to 
WRWKHH[WHQWSHUPLWWHGE\ODZOLFHQVH5LJKWVKROGHUV·86FRS\ULJKWVWRWKLUGSDUWLHV
(in the case of unclaimed Books and Inserts, the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary may license to 
third parties the Copyright Interests of Rightsholders of unclaimed Books and Inserts to the 
extent permitted by law).11 
 This passage is not a grant of power to the Registry or the UWF; it is a description of what the 
5HJLVWU\·V FRUSRUDWH FKDUWHU ZLOO ´DOORZ>@µ Lt to do. I could charter a company tomorrow to trade in 
widgetium, but its charter alone would give itno property rights to any actual widgetium. 
1RUGRHV WKHSKUDVH ´WR WKH H[WHQW SHUPLWWHGE\ ODZµ JLYH WKH5HJLVWU\ DQG8:) WKHSRZHU WR
hand out licenses. These are words of limitation, not of empowerment; they prevent the Registry from 
DFWLQJLOOHJDOO\7KHQRWLFHVHQWWRFODVVPHPEHUVVWDWHVWKDWLIWKH5HJLVWU\´UHSUHVHQWVWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKH
5LJKWVKROGHUVµLQ´FRPPHUFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVµZLWK´FRPSDQLHVRWKHUWKDQ*RRJOHµLWZLOOEH´VXEMHFWWRWKH
H[SUHVVDSSURYDORIWKH5LJKWVKROGHUVRIWKH%RRNVLQYROYHGµ12 7KHUH·VQRZD\WRVTXDUHWKDWGHVFULSWLRQ
with a settlement that authorizes the Registry to issue licenses for unclaimed works. Thus, on Day One, the 
5HJLVWU\DQG8:)ZRQ·WEHDEOHLVVXHOLFHQVHVWR7ZR-JOHEHFDXVHWKH\·OOKDYHQRWKLQJWRJLYH 
The Registry and UWF could eventually become licensing agents, but not under circumstances that 
will be much consolation to Two-gle. The Registry can act on behalf of the owners of claimed works (with 
WKHLU´H[SUHVVDSSURYDOµ,13EXWWKDWZRQ·WKHOS7ZR-gle obtain a license to unclaimed orphan works. As for 
                                               
5 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
6 Amended Settlement § 3.1(a) 
7 Amended Settlement § 2.2 
8 Amended Settlement § 7.1 (giving libraries a right to enter into standardized agreements with the Registry); attachments 
B-1, B-2, & B-3 (specifying form of these agreements).  Sections 2(a) of attachments B-1 and B-2 are the operative licenses.  The 
VHWWOHPHQWDQG*RRJOH·VVFDQQLQJDJUHHPHQWVSXWVWULFWOLPLWVRQKRZOLEUDULHVPD\XVHWKHLUGLJLWDOFRpies. 
9 Amended Settlement § 10.2(a). 
10 Amended Settlement § 3.1(a). 
11 Amended Settlement § 6.2(b)(i). 
12 Notice of Class Action Settlement 10. 
13 Amended Settlement § 2.4. 
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the UWF, the intent here is that if Congress wanted to allow third-party licenses for unclaimed works, the 
UWF would be ready to play that role. As the New York Times explained, paraphrasing settlement architect 
5LFKDUG6DUQRII ´7KH >8:)@with Congressional approval, can grant licenses to other companies who also 
ZDQW WR VHOO WKHVH ERRNVµ 14 (emphasis added). This argument³that the settlement might be useful to 
Congress³proves both too much and too little. On the one hand, if the settlement will be defective 
ZLWKRXW&RQJUHVVLRQDODFWLRQWKHQ&RQJUHVV·VSDVWLQDFWLRQLVDSRRUDUJXPHQWIRUGRLQJWKLVGHDOMXGLcially 
UDWKHUWKDQOHJLVODWLYHO\2QWKHRWKHU&RQJUHVVKDUGO\QHHGVWKHVHWWOHPHQW·VDVVLVWDQFHWRcreatean orphan 
works fiduciary capable of granting licenses to others; it could just create one from scratch. 
'RQ·WMXVWWDNHP\ZRUGIRULWWKDWWKHVHWWOHPHQWGRHVQ·WHPSRZHUWKH5HJLVWU\WRLVVXHRUSKDQ
ZRUNVOLFHQVHV$VNLWVGUDIWHUV7KH\´UHSUHVHQWHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKDWWKH\EHOLHYHWKH5HJLVWU\ZRXOG
lack the power and ability to license copyrighted books without the consent of the copyright oZQHUµ15 If 
WKH\IXQGDPHQWDOO\PLVXQGHUVWRRGWKHLURZQVHWWOHPHQW·VOHJDOHIIHFWVRUOLHGWRWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFH
about them, they have bigger problems than whether the settlement is approved or not. 
Professor Elhauge argues that if the Registry cannot legally license third parties even though it can 
DFW ´WR WKH H[WHQW SHUPLWWHG E\ ODZµ WKHQ WKH SDUWLHV KDYH ´GRQH DOO >WKH\@ OHJDOO\ FRXOGµ16 to promote 
nonexclusivity. ThisDUJXPHQWUHVWVRQDQHTXLYRFDWLRQ$VXVHGLQWKHVHWWOHPHQW´WRWKHH[WHQWSHUPLtted 
E\ODZµPHDQVWKDWRQFHWKHVWUXFWXUHVHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHVHWWOHPHQWDUH LQSODFHWKH5HJLVWU\DQG8:)
may do anything legally permissible to issue licenses. As Elhauge uses the phrase, it refers instead to what 
would have been legally permissible for the parties to have included in a hypothetical, more expansive class 
DFWLRQ VHWWOHPHQW 7KHVH DUHQ·W WKH VDPH 3HUKDSV WUXH QRQH[FOXVLYLW\ ZRXOG EH LPSRVVLEOH XQGHU 5XOH
23³EXWWKHSDUWLHVKDYHQ·WDWWHPSWHGWRILQGRXW 
IV. GOOGLE COMPETITORS CANNOT EASILY OBTAIN THEIR OWN CLASS-ACTION 
SETTLEMENTS 
Settlement proponents have also argued that Google competitors could obtain their own class-
DFWLRQVHWWOHPHQWVRQWKHVDPHWHUPVDV*RRJOH·V,W·VSRVVLEOHWKDWOLJKWQLQJFRXOGVWULNHWZLFH$IWHUDOO
who could have predicted the Authors Guild settlement? But a Two-gle settlement would be harder to 
negotiate and harder to win approval for. 
The Authors Guild settlement depends on choices made by copyright owners. The plaintiffs chose to 
VXHWRVWRS*RRJOH·VVFDQQing, chose to sue in a broad class action, chose to settle rather than go to trial, 
and chose to settle on terms that authorized selling full books. Take away even one of these freely made 
FKRLFHVDQGWKHUHZRXOGKDYHEHHQQR´JURXQGEUHDNLQJVHWWOHPHQWµ 
Two-JOHFRXOGQ·WUHSOLFDWHWKHAuthors Guild settlement without the active cooperation of authors 
and publishers. Just imagine the legal gyrations it would take to obtain a settlement over their objections. 
To get the case into court, Two-gle would need to bring a declaratory judgment action³and even that 
ZRXOG UHTXLUH FRS\ULJKW RZQHUV WR ´FRRSHUDWHµ E\ PDNLQJ RPLQRXV HQRXJK QRLVHV WR PDNH WKH FDVH
justiciable. Turning it into a class action is even harder, because in a declaratory judgment action, it would 
be a defendant-side class, which raises thorny civil procedure issues. (Who, for example, would serve as 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHIHQGDQWVRUSD\IRUWKHLUODZ\HUV"$QGZKHQLWFRPHVWLPHWRWDONVHWWOHPHQWWKHUH·VQR
way to guarantee Two-gle that the copyright owners would settle³let alone on specified terms³without 
fatally undermining the freedom to make litigation decisions on which the adversary system depends. Two-
JOH·VRQO\SODXVLEOHOLWLJDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ZRXOGEHWRFURVVLWVILQJHUVDQGSUD\ 
                                               
14 Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Terms of Digital Book Deal With Google Revised, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at B2. 
15 Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement (filed Sept. 18, 2009). 
16 Id. at 11. 
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Professor Elhauge argues, 
Rivals could simply engage in copying efforts similar to Google . . . . If no class action were 
brought against the copying rivals, then the rivals would be even better off because they 
would be able to offer the same books as Google without incurring the same royalty costs. 
 %XW WKDW FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RYHUORRNV WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ *RRJOH·V SUH- and post-settlement 
DFWLYLWLHV 6R IDU*RRJOH KDV RQO\ VFDQQHG ERRNV LQGH[HG WKHP DQG GLVSOD\HG VKRUW ´VQLSSHWVµ RI WKHLU
contents³a far cry from selling whole books. If Two-JOHPHUHO\VFDQQHGDQGLQGH[HGERRNVLWZRXOGQ·W
DFWXDOO\EHFRPSHWLQJZLWK*RRJOH·VSRVW-settlement programs. In order to compete in that market without 
benefit of class-action settlement, Two-gle would need to actually sell books³thereby exposing itself to 
much more severe copyright risks than Google has ever had to face. 
Some pro-settlement commentators, recognizing that the important choices are out of Two-JOH·V
hands, have argued that copyright owners would be eager to setWOHRQVLPLODUWHUPV,·PQRWVRVXUH7KH
5HJLVWU\·V SDUHQWV DW WKH $XWKRUV *XLOG DQG $VVRFLDWLRQ RI $PHULFDQ 3XEOLVKHUV FRXOG ZHOO IHDU WKDW D
second settlement would cause Google and Two-gle to drive retail prices down as they compete with each 
other for market share. On the other hand, if a different group of plaintiffs wanted to settle with Two-gle in 
order to compete with the existing Registry, we can expect the Registry and its allies to fight back. The 
result would be a race to the courthouse and a bitter struggle over class certification, negotiating authority, 
and control over the litigation. The Authors Guild settlement, as bitterly contested as it has been, managed to 
avoid some of this intra-class warfare because the plaintiffs stole a march on other copyright owners when 
they negotiated in secret for years and presented the results as a fait accompli. 
This leads us into the challenges Two-gle would face in winning approval for an already negotiated 
settlement. Of course, it would inherit all of the procedural challenges facing the current settlement: the 
FRXUW·V DUJXDEOH ODFN RI $UWLFOH ,,, DQG SHUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU PDQ\ FODVV PHPEHUV WKH
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVVRI WKHQDPHGSODLQWLIIV DQG WKH VHWWOHPHQW·V UHOHDVHRI IXWXUHFODLPVZLWKRXW D IDFtual 
QH[XV WR *RRJOH·V SDVW FRQGXFW $QG HYHQ WKH Authors Guild VHWWOHPHQW LWVHOI ZRXOGQ·W QHFHVVDULO\ EH
precedential in the Two-gle case. Another judge, especially one sitting in another circuit, and armed with 
the discretion district judges enjoy in deciding whether to approve class-action settlements, could well 
decide to disregard whatever Judge Chin says. 
A Two-gle settlement would also need to surmount some new and difficult hurdles of its own. For 
one, it would be open to challenge on collusiveness grounds. The Authors Guild lawsuit was genuinely 
adversarial when filed,17 the parties did significant pretrial work, and litigation remains a real possibility if 
the settlement falls through. But since a structured Two-gle settlement would be the goal ab initio, it would 
be difficult to negotiate one without calling into question the adequacy of the class representation or the 
existence of an Article III case or controversy. Unless Two-JOH·VVHWWOHPHQWGLIIHUHGIURP*RRJOH·VLQVRPH
material points, it mighWEHKDUGWRVD\WKDWLWZDVDFWXDOO\QHJRWLDWHGDWDUPV·OHQJWK 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed Google Books settlement is exclusive as to orphan works. This exclusivity may or 
PD\QRWEHDQDQWLWUXVWSUREOHP,W·VSRVVLEOHWRDUJXH³though I think incorrectly³that making Google 
the exclusive seller of unclaimed out-of-print books is automatically superior to having no one selling them. 
                                               
17 To the point that Paul Aiken of the Authors Guild told the New York Times that an opt-out system for securing copyright 
RZQHUV·SHUPLVVLRQV´WXUQHGORQJVWDQGLQJSUHFHGHQWVLQFRS\ULJKWODZXSVLGHGRZQµ(GZDUG:\DWWWriters Sue Google, Accusing 
It of Copyright Violation, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005. 
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,W·VDOVRSRVVLEOH WRDUJXH WKDWQRQHRI WKHDFWXDO VHWWOHPHQWSURJUDPVSRVHD WKUHDWRI VXSUD-competitive 
pricing. Here, I sWLOO GLVDJUHH WKRXJKZLWK VRPHZKDW OHVV FHUWDLQW\%XW DVZH H[DPLQH WKH VHWWOHPHQW·V
HIIHFWV DQG LPSOLFDWLRQV ZH VKRXOGQ·W NLG RXUVHOYHV WKDW LW·V QRQH[FOXVLYH )RU JRRG RU IRU LOO LW JLYHV
Google a unique privilege to sell orphan books. 
  
